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Dear Chief Judge Schroeder

Carl Tobias*

Congratulations on becommg the Chief Judge of the Umted States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 1 Judge Procter Hug, Jr., transferred that office to you on December 1, 2000, dunng a qmet penod
m the tribunal's life, affording several months of relative calm m which to assume the daunting
responsibility for Ninth Circuit operations.2 Your twenty-one-year service as an active court member will
promote the felicitous discharge of your new duties as chief judge and will ease resolution of the
difficulties that the tribunal will mvanably encounter.3
You have entered the pantheon of leaders whose century of collective expenence on the Ninth
Circuit enables them to address deftly numerous complex, delicate challenges mvolvmg the federal
government's coordinate branches, the three tiers of the judiciary, and relations between the national
government and the states. Examples mclude the court's efforts to secure resources from a budget-conscious
Congress; to msure efficient and farr disposition of the largest appeals court docket; and to address
perenmal attempts to split the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, as you know, there are bitter, longstanding
disputes among the Ninth Circuit judges and between those junsts and the Supreme Court over the death
penalty, as well as envrronmental, Indian and water law. The followmg discussion is a selective catalog of

Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, Uruversity of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to thank Bnant Platt, Michael
Higdon, and Peggy Sanner for suggestions, Angeline Garbett for processrng, and Jim Rogers for generous, continurng support.
See, e.g., Mary Schenk, Urbana Judge Named Chief of9th Circuit, Schroeder is First Woman on Bench m Largest Federal
Circuit, CHAMPAIGN NE\VS-GAZETIE, Jan. 14, 2001, at A3, at 2001 WL 9726414; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 1993)
(prescribrng the requrrements for becommg the chiefjudge and the responsibilities of the chiefjudge).
2

This c1rcumstance sharply contrasted with Judge Hug's expenence upon becomrng chief Judge rn 1996 when the Ninth
Circuit was embroiled m controversy. See Carl Tobias, Keeping It Together, RECORDER, Dec. 6, 2000, at 5 (comparrng the
transitional expenences of Chief Judges Hug and Schroeder); m.fra notes 21-38 and accompanymg text.
3

See John P Frank & Janet Napolitano, Judge Mary M Schroeder Twenty Years, 31 Aruz. ST. L.J. 705 (1999); see also John
P Frank, The Tenth Anniversary of Mary M Schroeder as a Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals, 22 Aruz. ST. L.J. 1
(1990); sources cited supra note 1; m.fra note 6 and accompanymg text.
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problems that will probably arise during your tenure as chief judge and some suggestions on how best to
resolve them.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE APPELLATE SYSTEM AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT

A.

THE APPELLATE SYSTEM

In 1891, Congress created the modem federal appellate system and it functioned well for the
succeeding eight decades. 4 Parties filed a comparatively small number of appeals, while the courts
operated with relatively few members and staff. During this period of time, panels comprised of three
active judges wrote thorough opinions only after full briefing, oral argument, and consultation. 5
Burgeoning appeals, however, have transformed the courts from the institutions they were a
generation ago. 6 Congress partially addressed case growth by creating new judgeships but failed to
authorize sufficient positions and other resources. 7 The tribunals also invoked some new approaches that
may have eroded appellate justice. For example, courts granted a dwindling percentage of oral arguments
and published fewer and less expansive decisions. 8 Circuits also relied more on nonjudicial personnel,
judges who were not tribunal members, and numerous other measures, including appeals management and
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 9 Although these changes may appear to diminish justice, most of
the actions actually enhanced justice by efficiently resolving numerous disputes in which parties needed
little argument or written explanation.

4

I rely here on THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS ( 1994);
JUDITH MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1993) (outlining the
difficulties that the appeals courts face and recommending possible solutions through structural alteration); CoMM'N ON
STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 13-32 (1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT] (recounting the history of the federal judicial structure under increasing use of the appeal process); Carl Tobias, A
Federal Appellate System for the Twenty-First Century, 74 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1999) (discussing concerns about the appellate
system and suggesting remedies).

See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 4, at 14-30 (describing the traditional conception of how the appellate system should operate);
JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 10-11, 42 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]
(tracing the change in the courts over time); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 ( 1990) (discussing how the
appellate system has changed over the past generation).
6

See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 109 (discussing how the appellate system has
changed over the past generation); LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 42 (describing a growth in circuit size and caseload);
Procter Hug, Jr., Introduction to the Symposium, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 319, 320 (2000) (revealing the effects of increasing
caseloads); Tobias, supra note 4, at 278 (recounting changes in the system due to greater caseloads).
7

See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 Aruz. ST. L.J. 917, 948 (1990); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of
Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1388 (1995) (discussing the inadequacies of Congress's addition ofjudgeships).
8

See, e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 5, at 42; MCKENNA, supra note 4, at 42-49 (analyzing the decline in oral arguments
and published decisions).
9

See, e.g., MCKENNA, supra note 4, at 38-42, 49-53 (discussing courts of appeals' techniques for treating a growing number
of appeals); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 21-25 (reporting on use of alternative processes for decisionmaking and
support staff); see also JUDITH MCKENNA ET AL., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (2000);
ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS INTHE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1997); ANTHONY PARTRIDGE &
ALLAN LIND, A REEVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN (1983) (describing the Civil Appeals Management
Plan used by the Second Circuit).

162

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

DEAR CHIEF JUDGE SCHROEDER
B.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The Ninth Circuit is the largest appeals court by several important parameters. The tribunal covers a
gigantic geographical expanse, ranging from the Arctic Circle to the Mexican border and from eastern
Montana to the middle of the Pacific Ocean. The court comprises eight western states, Hawaii, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands; has twenty-eight active appellate judges and 106 active district judges; has ninetysix bankruptcy judges and sixty-eight magistrate judges; reviews 9,000 cases annually; and serves 50 million
people. JO The Ninth Circuit treats many controversial legal and policy questions and is essentially the court of
last resort for the western United States because the Supreme Court hears so few appeals.
The tribunal, like other appellate courts, addressed dramatic docket expansion with some success,
despite inadequate resources. II The circuit afforded smaller percentages of arguments and published
opinions, while it depended substantially on court staff, judges of other tribunals, and certain approaches
such as case management, ADR, a special en bane process, and administrative units. 12 Many of those,
and numerous related measures also helped the circuit function efficiently.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit employs personnel imaginatively. The staff"inventory" fully briefed
appeals; notify judges of issues raised to help maintain consistent circuit law; assist judicial "screening
panels" to terminate 150 cases monthly using truncated procedures; and discharge appeals management
and ADR duties. 13 The court also created the office of appellate commissioner that processes Criminal
Justice Act vouchers for lawyer compensation; rules on motions, usually those seeking counsel's
appointment and withdrawal; and acts as a special master on certain matters, including attorney discipline

JO See NINilI CIRCUIT REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, s. REP. No. 104-197, at 9 (1995) (outlining the Ninth Circuit's
composition and the court's judgeships) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41 (West 1993), 44 (West Supp. 2001)
(same); see also 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 133 (West Supp. 2001), 152, 633 (West 1993) (affording the district, magistrate and bankruptcy
judgeships); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 27, 30, 32 (affording the appellate and district judgeships, the number of
appeals and the population base served).

II See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR TIIE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS, 93 tbl.1 (1998)
[hereinafter WORKING PAPERS] (providing statistics for appellate caseloads in 1997); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4,
at 13-17, 30-32 (discussing increase in workload and methods used to manage it); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
12
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 30-32 (describing the use of staff attorneys, mediators, screening panels,
administrative units, and limited en bane hearings); WORKING PAPERS, supra note 11, at 93 tbls.2-3 (reporting statistics on oral
arguments and published opinions), 108 tbl.6a (providing percentage of appeals involving at least one visiting judge); Arthur D.
Hellman, Getting it Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
425 (2000); see also JOE CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINilI CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS
PROJECT (1985); MCKENNA, supra note 9, at 159-74 (discussing the duties of the staff of the Ninth Circuit and the procedural
route of cases); RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF TIIE NINilI CIRCUIT AND TIIE FUTURE OF TIIE FEDERAL COURTS
(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) [hereinafter RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE]; James R. Browning, Innovations of the Ninth Circuit, 34
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357 (2000).
13

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 31 (outlining the duties of nonjudicial personnel); see also NIEMIC, supra note 9, at
72-80 (treating prepublication reports and stating that off-panel judges' ability to question panel opinions also fosters
uniformity); Arthur Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL.
L. REV. 377, 395-96 (2000) (discussing the monitoring of panel opinions); Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts ofAppeals' Final Report: An Analysis ofthe'Commission's Recommendations for the Ninth
Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 887, 907 (1999) (describing the use of prepublication reports and memoranda exchange to ensure
consistency in decisions).
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and fee award requests in civil cases. 14 Moreover, the circuit has earned a reputation for according most
appeals written explanations. 15
The court also experiments with many innovative concepts that facilitate case disposition, making it
a national laboratory and a model for large tribunals. 16 Illustrative is its implementation of Bankruptcy
Appellate Panels (BAP), 17 which proved so valuable that Congress asked every appeals court to consider
creating them. 18 These actions have fostered prompt, economical and fair resolution, partly by conserving
judicial resources.
Neither the Ninth Circuit itself nor the federal judiciary agrees about the courts' greatest problems or
the best way to treat them. There is consensus, however, that the tribunals face increasing caseloads with
relatively static resources. Although few believe restructuring the geography of the Ninth Circuit will be
effective, the latest attempt to split the Ninth Circuit exposed different opinions among its judges,
representing the first time any member publicly supported division. Nevertheless, a majority still opposes
the notion and favors continued testing of, and reliance on, approaches that promise to improve operations
without restructuring the circuit. 19

14

See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 31 (outlining the duties of the appellate commissioner); see also Browning, supra
note 12, at 361 (describing the creation of the appellate commissioner position); Procter Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Should Not
Be Split, 57 MONT. L. REV. 291, 305 (1996) (discussing advantages of having an appellate commissioner); John B. Oakley &
Robert S. Thompson, Screening, Delegation and the Values ofAppeal, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 97, 135-37
(suggesting measures to deal with ever increasing caseload).
15

Interview with Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, Ninth Circuit (May 7, 1999); Interview with Pamela Ann Rymer, Judge, Ninth
Circuit (Mar. 20, 1998); see also Hug, supra note 14, at 298 (lauding the percentage of written decisions issued by the Ninth
Circuit in 1995).
16

See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 30-32 (discussing procedures used by the Ninth Circuit); infra note 48 and
accompanying text. For analysis of many of these measures, see supra note 12, especially CECIL and RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE.
17

See, e.g., Michael A. Berch, The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Its Implications for Adoption of Specialist Panels in the
Courts ofAppeals, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 165-91; Gordon Bermant & Judy Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate
Panels: The Ninth Circuit Experience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181 (1989); Browning, supra note 12, at 362 (analyzing the
establishment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel). See generally NAT'L BANKRUPTCY REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT 764-66 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC].
18

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), 108 Stat. 4106, 4109-10; see also LONG RANGE PLAN,
supra note 5, at 47 (discussing BAPs). Large size has benefits, such as economies of scale; flexibility to assign districts
resources to treat case growth; and diversity in terms of case mixes and judges' backgrounds. See Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing
the Ninth Circuit: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 57 MONT. L. REv. 261, 273 (1996) (arguing the advantages oflarge
circuit size); Hug, supra note 14, at 300-02 (discussing the benefits of size); Margaret Z. Johns, The Advantages of Larger
Federal Courts ofAppeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 471 (2000) (same). Some dispute these ideas or find any benefits eclipsed by
detriments. See, e.g., Edward R. Becker, Contemplating the Future ofthe Federal Courts ofAppeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 343
(2000); infra notes 37-38, 44 and accompanying text.
19

See Letter from Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, to Justice White and Members of the Commission on Structural Alternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Oct. 29, 1998) (on file with Stanford Law & Policy Review) (affording alternate
recommendations for how to improve operations in the Ninth Circuit); Letter from Eugene A. Wright et al., Senior United States
Circuit Judge, to Byron R. White, Chairman, Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6,
1998) (on file with Stanford Law & Policy Review) at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/OScannlain.htm (calling
for a split of the Ninth Circuit); see also Diarmuid O'Scannlain, United States Circuit Judge, to Byron R. White, Chairman,
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998) (on file with Stanford Law & Policy
Review), at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/DOScannlain.htm (calling for a split, but suggesting that the Circuit
itself decide how best to divide); infra note 40. See generally Hug, supra note 15; Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split
Study Commission: Now What ? 57 MONT. L. REv. 313 ( 1996).
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II.

cmCUIT RECONFIGURATION

One of your major concerns will be the ongoing dispute over possible Ninth Circuit reconfiguration,
a controversy that originated in the 1940s or perhaps even earlier.20 Judge Hug expended enormous
energy on this issue and successfully opposed realignment. The jurist also required the court to undertake
self-study and encouraged the tribunal to test and apply a variety of mechanisms intended to enhance
circuit functioning.
A.

THE MOST RECENT CIRCUIT-SPLITTING EFFORT

When Chief Judge Hug first assumed office in 1996, the court was embroiled in a debate over its
future begun by senators from the Pacific Northwest. 21 Judge Hug, as well as members of his circuit and
Congress, including Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.), persuasively resisted bifurcation and urged further
study of the appellate system.22 During late 1997, Congress authorized the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (the Commission) and provided it one year to assess the
tribunals, particularly the Ninth Circuit, and issue recommendations.23 In December 1998, the Commission
proposed a divisional arrangement for the Ninth Circuit and the other courts as they grow.24 One month later,
senators introduced a bill embodying this idea.25 Judge Hug scrutinized the divisional plan and measure,
found them unworkable, and widely circulated his criticisms.26 Not content to be merely a constructive
critic, Judge Hug simultaneously created a Ninth Circuit Evaluation Committee (the Committee),27 asking

20

See Baker, supra note 7, at 928; Hellman, supra note 13, at 378-79 (recounting the history of the White Commission);
Tobias, supra note 7, at 1363-76 (recounting the history of early proposals for splitting the Ninth Circuit).
21

S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); 141 CONG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (speaking on behalf
of western state senators introducing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995); BAKER, supra note 4, at
74-105 (describing past congressional decision not to divide Ninth Circuit); SENATE REPORT, supra note 10 (analyzing the Ninth
Circuit Reorganization Act); Tobias, supra note 7, at 1376-95 (discussing support for and opposition to Senate Bill 956).

22

See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 19-20; Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49
FLA. L. REV. 189, 202-11 (1997) (discussing congressional studies regarding the courts of appeals). For previous studies, see
Thomas E. Baker, A Generation Spent Studying the United States Courts ofAppeals: A Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 395
(2000).
23

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119,

§ 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491-93 (1997) (establishing the Commission). See generally Tobias, supra note 22, at 214-19 (discussing
the task set before the Commission).
24

See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 40-50 (recommending a divisional arrangement of the Ninth Circuit consisting of
three, relatively independent, regional divisions). See generally Hellman, supra note 13, at 381-93 (reporting on the
recommendations of the Commission); Hug, supra note 13, at 897-99, 901-06, 909-17; John B. Oakley, Comparative Analysis of
Alternative Plans for the Divisional Organization of the Ninth Circuit, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483 (2000); Special Issue on the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 15 J.L. & POL. 379-580 (1999).
25

See S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing implementation of the Commission's suggestions); see also 145 CONG. REc. S742
(daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (introducing S. 253). See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 89-91 (affording the
suggested statute on which senators premised S. 253).
26

See Hug, supra note 13 (analyzing the recommendations of the Commission).
(commenting on the Commission's report); sources cited supra note 24.

See generally Tobias, supra note 4

27

See NINTH CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMM., INTERIM REPORT (Mar. 2000), at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf
(on file with Stanford Law & Policy Review) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. The Committee's membership principally
comprised active Ninth Circuit judges whom a number of presidents had appointed
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that the body assess the tribunal and develop recommendations in light of the concerns of the Commission
and additional federal court observers. 28
In July 1999, the Senate and House held public hearings on the commissioners' report and the
legislative proposal. 29 Judge Hug and Ninth Circuit Judge Charles Wiggins testified against the
Commission's approach and the bill,30 although Ninth Circuit Judge Pamela Ann Rymer spoke in favor of
them. 31 Senator Feinstein simultaneously sponsored a measure that would have reformed the en bane
process and required at least one Ninth Circuit member who was stationed in the region where an appeal
originated to serve on the three-judge panel deciding that case.32
In March 2000, the Evaluation Committee issued an Interim Report with twenty-five proposals, a
number of which the court later adopted. 33 The Report responded to Commission and general concerns
about the en bane process, regionalism, collegiality, communications, disposition time, and consistency.
For example, the Committee successfully recommended changes in the limited en bane court that now
convenes quarterly and reconsiders more appeals than it did before the reforms were proposed.34 The
tribunal is also testing regional assignments, whereby one circuit judge in the northern administrative unit

28

Id at 2 (establishing the objectives of the Committee); see also Procter Hug, Jr., Responding to Ninth Circuit Concerns: The
Innovative Work of the Evaluation Committee (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Stanford Law & Policy Review);
David R. Thompson, The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals Evaluation Committee, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 365 (2000).

29

See Review of the Report by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals Regarding the
Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act: Hearing on S. 253 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]; Oversight
Hearings on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts ofAppeals Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999).
30

See Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 41, 113 (recording the testimony of Judge Hug and Judge Wiggins). See generally
Hellman, supra note 13, at 380-81 (reporting on congressional action regarding the courts of appeals); Hug, supra note 28
(relaying the work of the Evaluation Committee); Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Split By Any Other Name ... , 15 J.L. & POL.
397 ( 1999) (suggesting a lack of empirical justification for the White Commission's recommendations).
31

Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 59; see also id (stating that Judge Rymer served as a commissioner). See generally
Hellman, supra note 13, at 387 (discussing Judge Rymer's support of the Commission findings); Pamela Ann Rymer, How Big is
Too Big?, 15 J.L. & POL. 383 (1999) (outlining the White Commission proposal); Pamela Ann Rymer, Implications of the White
Commission, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 351 (2000).
32

See S. 1403, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing changes in the en bane procedure for the Ninth Circuit); see also 145 CONG.
REC. S8884 (daily ed. July 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 6 (statement of Sen.
Feinstein); infi"a notes 34-35 and accompanying text. See generally Thompson, supra note 28, at 374-75 (discussing the regional
concerns behind Senator Feinstein's bill); Carl Tobias, The Next Step for the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1407, 1416 (2000)
(outlining the proposals in the bill); Penny Arevalo, Ninth Circuit Remains Intact-for Now, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 2000, at
80.
33
See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 27 (listing recommendations for the improvement of processes and greater efficiency). See
generally Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Approach for the Ninth Circuit, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (2000) (analyzing
the Commission's report); Thompson, supra note 28 (discussing the approach of the Evaluation Committee to problems in the
Ninth Circuit).
34

See INTERJM REPORT, supra note 27 (providing suggestions for improvement in the en bane procedure and for increased
consistency in "The En Banc Process" section of the report). See generally Hug & Tobias, supra note 33, at 1669-70 (discussing
the en bane process and collegiality within the circuit). "[O]nly the Ninth Circuit uses a statutorily authorized 'limited en bane'
court." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 32. See generally Omnibus Judgeships Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat.
1629 (authorizing additional judgeships); 9rn CIR. R. 35-3 (prescribing the requirements for a limited en bane court); Hellman,
supra note 13, at 386-91 (discussing uniformity in the circuit and the en bane procedure).
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hears cases arising from that geographical area. 35 The court has instituted Committee recommendations to
expedite resolution, namely increased "batching" of appeals with similar issues; to preserve and promote
uniformity such as creation of an "electronic mailbox" and closer staff analysis of rehearing en bane
petitions, which help identify potential conflicts; and to facilitate operations, including expanded
outreach.36
Despite the efforts of the Commission and the Committee, senators offered a proposal that would
split the tribunal during March 2000.37 They criticized the divisional notion and reiterated ideas that the
size of the Ninth Circuit allows too many reversals, delays disposition, and does not foster sufficient
collegiality, communication, and consistency.38 In the end, the 106th Congress passed :µone of the three
reform bills, which would have authorized a divisional plan, modified the en bane process and mandated
regional assignments, or bifurcated the court.
B.

CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND FUTURE CONCERNS

The amount of attention you should devote to possible realignment is unclear. Western lawmakers
have orchestrated unsuccessful circuit-splitting campaigns for years,39 but the latest initiative marked the
first time that any of the court's judges supported division.4° Changed circumstances, however, might
mean you need to accord reconfiguration little energy. Senators who have avidly pursued realignment
seem to find the issue less urgent, possibly reflecting several phenomena. The first is reduced concern
about reversals because the High Court has reviewed somewhat fewer Ninth Circuit opinions in the last
four terms.41 A second and closely related factor could be the Ninth Circuit's recently appointed judges,
who may possess rather moderate political perspectives and whose decisions have received comparatively
limited criticism. A third factor is the implementation of some of the recommendations, which manifest
greater concern for users of circuit services, adopted partly at the Evaluation Committee's behest. For
example, the tribunal has increased en bane rehearings and experimented with regional assignments.42

35

See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 27 (discussing concerns in "Regional Sensitivity and Outreach" section); see also supra
notes 12, 32 and accompanying text. See generally Hug & Tobias, supra note 33, at 1670; Thompson, supra note 28, at 374-75
(analyzing regional problems); Arevalo, supra note 32.

36

See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 27 (highlighting main objectives of new methods for the Ninth Circuit in "Improving
Processes and Efficiencies" and "Consistency of Decisions" sections); see also infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. See
generally Hug & Tobias, supra note 33, at 1667-69, 1671 (discussing the Evaluation Committee's proposals of measures to
improve efficiency); Thompson, supra note 28, at 369-74 (reporting Committee recommendations for new methods).
37

See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing a split of the Ninth Circuit); see also 146 CONG. REc. S1233 (daily ed. Mar. 7,
2000) (statement of Sen. Murkowski); id. at S1234 (statement of Sen. Hatch) [hereinafter Senators' Statements]; supra note 25,
infra note 44 and text accompanying those notes; Scott Bales, The Ninth Circuit: Should It Stay or Should It Go? 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 379, 386-88 (2000).

38

See Senators' Statements, supra note 37; see also supra notes 20-21; infra note 44.

39

See supra notes 21, 37-38 and accompanying text; infra note 44 and accompanying text.

40

See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 79 (testimony of Judge Kleinfeld); id.
at 87 (testimony of Judge O'Scannlain); id. at 188 (statement of Judge Sneed).

41

See NINIH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS LAW LIBRARY TABLE ON U.S. SUPREME COURT REVERSAL RATES (2000); see also
Hellman, supra note 12, at 431-52 (discussing the reversal rates for the Ninth Circuit); Hug & Tobias, supra note 33, at 1669-70
(questioning the relationship of the en bane process to reversal rates).
42

See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text; see also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, the 2000 elections created an even Senate split between Republicans and Democrats and a slight
Republican House majority, while Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), bifurcation's foremost advocate, lost
his seat. 43
Notwithstanding these notions, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska) introduced a circuit-division
proposal in February 2001, espousing previously articulated justifications for division, namely the
reversal rate, slow resolution, and inconsistency.44 It is not clear why the lawmaker introduced the
measure at this time. Perhaps he thought this action would rekindle waning public interest or that a
Republican president might be more likely to sign a bill than his Democratic predecessor. A complex mix
of considerations, such as Congress's composition, the nascent status of the Bush Administration, and
legislative concern about imposing a statutory solution opposed by most Ninth Circuit judges,
complicates accurate prediction.45
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

C.

In short, the safest course of action throughout your tenure would be to assume that bifurcation's
staunch proponents and other critics of the court will press for change and to monitor closely matters that
implicate a potential split. The longstanding character of questions raised by the Ninth Circuit's
substantial magnitude and the persistence of those who champion reconfiguration will make vigilance
important.
A useful way to track developments may be by retaining the Evaluation Committee. It analyzed the
tribunal in light of concerns expressed by the Commission and advocates of division and proffered many
ideas that have improved operations.46 Illustrative are responses to issues involving regionalism and
communications. The court should expand ongoing attempts that maximize outreach and linkages
between the circuit and its consumers. For instance, the Committee urged, and the tribunal has tested,
regional assignments, while the tribunal has conducted additional sessions of the court and bench-bar
meetings across the circuit.47 The Committee could further scrutinize the tribunal and formulate more

43

Forty-nine Republican members of the Senate recently signed a letter requesting that President George W. Bush appoint
Senator Gorton to the Ninth Circuit. See Jason Hoppin, GOP Senators Want Gorton on the 9th Circuit, RECORDER, Feb. 16,
2001, at l (reporting the possibility of Gorton's nomination for a Ninth Circuit judgeship despite his earlier advocacy for
splitting the circuit); Mark Preston, Gorton May Get Key Judgeship, ROLL CALL, Feb. 15, 2001; Constance Sommer, Gorton's
Loss Is a Win for an Intact 9th Circuit, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 2001, at 70. Of course, Vermont Senator James Jeffords's
decision to become an independent in May 2001 accorded the Democrats a slight Senate majority. See, e.g., Jeanne Cummings,
How One Man's Urge to Bolt GOP Rattles Much of Washington, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2001, at Al; Alison Mitchell, Balance of
Power: The Senator; G.O.P. Senator Plans Shift, Giving Democrats Control in Setback for White House, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2001, at Al.
44

S. 346, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing a split of the Ninth Circuit); see also 147 CONG. REC. Sl476 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Murkowski); supra note 37 and accompanying text. House Bill 1203, 107th Cong. (2001), an identical
measure, was introduced five weeks later. 147 CONG. REC. Hll 14 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001). Both bills are quite similar to
Senate Bill 2184, the 2000 measure.
45

So long as measures like Senate Bill 346 and House Bill 1203 disadvantage California by, for instance, authorizing too few
judges to resolve cases promptly, you can rely on the opposition of its delegation in Congress to defeat the bills. See O'Scannlain,
supra note 19, at 317 (discussing the impracticability of recommended splits); Tobias, supra note 7, at 1382 (describing the
imbalance that would be created by a circuit split); see also Bales, supra note 37, at 385 (outlining the difficulty in treating
California's size in any proposed split).
46

Supra notes 27-28, 33-36 and accompanying text.

47

See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 27 (suggesting improvements in the "Regional Sensitivity and Outreach" section of the
report); see also Hug & Tobias, supra note 33, at 1670 (discussing the Committee's recommendations for preserving and
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suggestions. The court must continue innovative experimentation with salutary measures.48 Over the past
three decades, the Ninth Circuit has been a national leader in testing inventive mechanisms to promote
expeditious, inexpensive, and equitable disposition, and it has essentially functioned as an experimental
laboratory and a prototype for large tribunals.
Testing innovations and retaining the Evaluation Committee hold greater promise than either the
divisional plan or bifurcation to solve the dilemma of rising appeals and limited resources. Finally, in
addition to emphasizing the limitations of realignment, you should consider consulting members of each
tribunal and Congress to develop the best approach for addressing case growth with static resources.
ID. DAILY ADMINISTRATION
Another seemingly mundane, but significant, responsibility of the chiefjudge is day-to-day Ninth Circuit
administration. This entails efforts that will help guarantee that the court of appeals and the fifteen federal
districts in the West which constitute the Ninth Circuit operate as effectively as possible. One important
means of fulfilling that obligation is to preside over the Circuit Judicial Council (the Council), which is the
body responsible for policymaking.49
Do not forget that the former chief judges possess a wealth of expertise about daily matters and rely
heavily on the talented employees in the Circuit Executive and Clerk of Court Offices for valuable help.50
These personnel enable the biggest tribunal to function smoothly by anticipating concerns before they become
actual problems and by carefully treating difficulties that materialize. The staff specifically monitors judicial
resources, namely vacancies; caseload size and complexity; and the time for resolution and related
phenomena. When the officials detect complications, they alert the Council so that it may institute curative
actions. For example, the entity might seek support from senior and visiting judges to combat mounting
appellate dockets51 or temporarily assign other courts' members to address district civil backlogs.52

increasing collegiality); Thompson, supra note 28, at 375 (analyzing concerns about regionalism and collegiality). See generally
Hug, supra note l•:f. at 304-05 (praising the responsiveness of the Ninth Circuit). Chief Judge Hug undertook extraordinary efforts
to be an ambassador for the entire region, especially geographic areas in which Ninth Circuit panels do not regularly sit
48

I rely here and in the remainder of this paragraph on supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.

49

Its duties include temporarily assigning judges to courts needing aid; reviewing districts' rules and plans for choosing juries,
Criminal Justice Act appointments, and court reporters; resolving disputes involving district judges' residences and workloads;
reviewing and approving construction and renovation plans; appointing BAPs; resolving judicial disability and unfitness
complaints; and planning circuit-wide events, such as the judicial conference. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 30; see also
28 U.S.C.A. § 332 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001) (requiring the Chief Judge to call a judicial council); John Oliver, Reflections on
the History of Circuit Judicial Councils and Circuit Judicial Conferences, 64 F.R.D. 201 (1975); William W Schwarzer, The
Federal Judicial Center and the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1129, 1149 (1995)
(discussing the purpose of the council).
50

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 332(e), 711-15 (West 1993) (establishing the office of Circuit Executive and staff support positions); see also
Cathy A. Catterson, The Changing Ninth Circuit, 21 Aruz. ST. L.J. 173 (1989) (discussing changes in the methods used to
resolve appeals in the Ninth Circuit); Cathy A. Catterson, The Role of the Sta.ff in the Operation of the Ninth Circuit, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 389 (2000). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 150-57 (1996)
(indicating heavy reliance of judges on their clerks for writing opinions); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITII, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST:
FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRATION 94-125 (1995).
51

See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 291, 294 (West 1993) (authorizing temporary assignment of district or retired judges to sit on appeals
panels); see also infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 31 (mentioning
the use of judges from the circuit); BAKER, supra note 4, at 198-201 (suggesting use of current non-appellate judges to resolve
increasing caseloads); Tobias, supra note 22, at 230 (discussing the methods used to address dockets in several circuits).
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A.

RESOURCES

You can facilitate operations by maximizing the judicial resources available for discharge of the many
circuit duties. An obvious method is to ensure the appeals court works at full strength using all twentyeight judges.53 Since 1996, slow Senate confirmation of nominees has in essence left the circuit with
seventy-five percent of its judicial complement. 54 Judge Hug repeatedly urged the president and senators
to fill the empty seats. Due to his concerted efforts, there were only three vacancies when you assumed
office. Functioning at total capacity will require cooperation with the chief executive and senators
through reminders of the need to approve nominees for every opening. The tribunal could also depend
more on its senior and visiting judges;55 however, these ideas have limits. The pressures in working
absent one-fourth of your members might have exhausted senior judges. Although visitors can increase
intercircuit uniformity and diversity, reliance on visiting judges might erode intracircuit consistency and
collegiality, insofar as the jurists appreciate less the court's case law, members, and traditions. 56
Another approach would be to encourage the legislature to pass the first thorough judgeships bill
since 1990.57 The Judicial Conference suggestions for Congress, which are premised on conservative
calculations of judges' workloads and appeals, propose five new Ninth Circuit positions. 58 Their
52

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 292(b) (West 1993) (authorizing assignment ofa district judge to another district); see also Hug, supra
note 14, at 300 (indicating the advantages in having a large circuit pool of judges for temporary assignment elsewhere in the
circuit); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 30-31 (discussing the use ofvisitingjudges).

53

The need to fill appellate openings is more urgent, but similar ideas apply to the 106 district judges.

54

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 30; Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37 (analyzing
politi<:s as contributing to slow confirmation of federal judges); see also Carl Tobias, Filling The Federal Appellate Openings on
the Ninth Circuit, 19 REv. LITIG. 233 (2000) (considering the reasons behind the national and Ninth Circuit judicial vacancies
problem, analyzing the recommendations suggested by the Commission on Structrual Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals, and recommending alternative solutions); Carl Tobias, The Judicial Vacancy Conundrum in the Ninth Circuit, 63
BROOK. L. REv. 1283 (1997) (evaluating recent developments contributing to the vacancies on the ~Ninth Circuit and
recommending solutions).
55

See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also WORKING PAPERS, supra note 11, at 108, tbl.6a (showing that 43 percent
of three-judge panels in 1997 included at least one judge who was not a Ninth Circuit judge).
56

See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 4, at 198-201 (discussing benefits and drawbacks of various options for increasing the supply of
appellate ''judgepower"); Carl Tobias, The Federal Appeals Courts at Century's End, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 549, 558 (2000).
See generally sources cited supra notes 18, 51 (considering the appropriateness of excluding senior appellate judges from the
category of visiting judge).
57

Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 202-206, 104 Stat. 5089, 5098-104 (authorizing additional
federal judgeships); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 302, 385 n.38 (2000) (discussing Congress's
failure to create significant numbers of new federal judgeships since 1990). See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING
FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 241-47 (1997) (discussing comprehensive
judgeship legislation such as the Omnibus Judgeships Act of 1978); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2000 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (200 I), at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2000year-endreport.html (thanking Congress
for creating new district court judgeships this year and mentioning the request for more court of appeals judgeships among
others); Tobias, supra note 22, at 235 (suggesting that Congress has traditionally employed the solution of"creating additional
appellate judgeships").
58

See JUDICIAL CoNF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 21-23 (1999) (suggesting the addition of five new Ninth
Circuit judgeships); see also S. 3071, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing the authorization of additional federal judgeships);
O'Scannlain, supra note 19, at 315 (arguing for splitting the Ninth Circuit rather than adding many additional judges). But see
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 106TH CONG.,
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1999)
[hereinafter CHAIRMAN'S REPORT] (recommending filling vacancies but denying the existence of a need to create additional
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authorization could enhance daily operations, yet prove controversial because numerous lawmakers who
favor circuit-splitting already consider the court too large, and judges disagree about the bench's optimal
size.59
Despite these problems, now could be a propitious time to fill the vacancies and enact a
comprehensive judgeships measure. Current GOP control of the House and presidency and only a slight
Democratic majority in the Senate mean that Republican lawmakers and the chief executive might be able
to expedite the approval of judges and of additional judicial positions. You should cooperate with
legislators, particularly those who represent states in the Ninth Circuit, to confirm nominees and to pass a
judgeships bill.
You must also assess actions apart from seating the judges and securing more positions to facilitate
the functioning of the circuit. The chief option would be to increase the number of, or duties. of,
nonjudicial personnel who perform tasks that conserve the bench's energy. For instance, increasing the
number of staff attorneys from forty-eight or expanding their obligations to draft opinions in "routine"
cases and conduct alternative dispute resoluton (ADR) might save judicial resources. However, these
actions could further bureaucratize a tribunal that some observers already find overly bureaucratic.60
B.

PROCESS SOLUTIONS

The Ninth Circuit must continue to explore all feasible measures, especially procedural ones, which
facilitate prompt, economical, and fair resolution of increasing dockets with few resources. For example,
mechanisms such as BAPs and "screening panels" preserve judges' time and facilitate disposition yet
deliver justice; while other techniques, such as inventorying and quarterly sessions of the limited en bane
court, maintain and promote uniformity. 61 Some tribunals already may have maximized most of the
benefit they can glean from process reforms, particularly ones that involve case management and ADR.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit should proceed with testing such potential reforms and continue
developing the above approaches and related ideas. Experimentation has been successful for thirty years,
and the recent improvements promoted by the Evaluation Committee suggest that this avenue can lead to
even more gains.62 The court might also contact the remaining regional circuits, the Federal Judicial
judgeships). See generally Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 741, 753 (1997) (considering the possible tradeoffs involved in increasing federal judgeships).
59

As to Congress, see Senators' Statements, supra note 37 (arguing for a split of the Ninth Circuit). As to judges, compare Jon
0. Newman, 1000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993) (arguing against increasing
the size of the federal judiciary) and Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70 (arguing against
increasing the size of the federal judiciary), with Hug, supra note 6, at 321 (arguing that the number ofNinth Circuit judges
must be increased before the court accepts a larger caseload) and Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea
to Save the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 (arguing for an increase in the size of the federal judiciary); see also
GORDON BERMANT ET AL., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND
IMPLICATIONS (1993).
60

See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 23-25 (discussing the increase injudges' reliance on staff attorneys and law clerks
and its effects on judicial bureaucratization); POSNER, supra note 50, at 150-57 (discussing the negative effects caused by the
growth of the federal judiciary); SMITH, supra note 50, at 94-125 (considering the increase in judges' administrative tasks). See
generally Jerry Goldman, Appellate Justice Economized: Screening and Its Effect on Outcomes and Legitimacy, in
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 138, 162-64 (discussing the effects ofjudicial screening of cases); Jennifer E. Spreng,
Proposed Ninth Circuit Split: The Icebox Cometh: A Former Clerk: s View ofthe Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REV.
875, 904, 924-27 (1998) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit is too large and bureaucratic to function effectively).
61

See supra notes 12-18, 34-36, 42 and accompanying text.

62

See supra notes 12-18, 33-36, 42, 46-48 and accompanying text.
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Center (FJC), and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) to ascertain whether these tribunals
have tested or applied productive concepts that the Ninth Circuit could usefully institute. 63
C.

LOCAL RULE REVIEW

Many significant Council tasks are rather obscure. Typical is the obligation to review local
admiralty, bankruptcy, civil, and criminal procedures of the fifteen district courts under circuit jurisdiction
for consistency with the federal rules and statutes and to abrogate or modify those that are conflicting or
redundant. 64 Chief Judges Procter Hug and J. Clifford Wallace successfully implemented these
commands.65 They delegated responsibility for this effort to the Conference of Chief District Judges, the
entity that could best accomplish the important, delicate task of analyzing and proposing changes in local
measures. The body named a Local Rules Review Committee (LRRC), which evaluated all the districts'
strictures and prepared a thorough report suggesting alterations, many of which the courts adopted. 66 You
may wish to revitalize that endeavor or commission another because the local provisions have received no
circuit-wide scrutiny since 1997 when the LRRC completed its work. Since then, the 1990 Civil Justice
Reform Act, under which some districts applied inconsistent local requirements, has expired, so that
those procedures must be eliminated or modified. 67 Moreover, the 2000 federal civil rules revisions
should promote consistency by omitting most provisos that expressly authorized districts to prescribe
conflicting local measures. 68

63

28 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. (West 1993 & Supp. 2001) (creating FJC as the courts' research arm and stating its duties); 28
U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq. (West 1993 & Supp. 2001) (creating AO as the courts' administrative arm); Schwarzer, supra note 49, at
1144-47 (comparing their duties).

64

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 332(d)(4), 207l(a) (West 1993) (prescribing rule review function of judicial councils); FED. R. Clv.
P. 83 (same as to civil rules); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 (same as to criminal rules). See generally Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988
and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589, 1600-01 (1994) (discussing congressional attempts to restrict the
increasing creation of conflicting procedural rules).
65

See DISTRICT LOCAL RULES REVIEW COMMIITEE, REPORT TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1997) [hereinafter
LRRC]. See generally Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 533
(2002).
66

See LRRC REPORT, supra note 65. For general analyses of the endeavor undertaken by the LRRC and how the process
operated in two districts, see Walter W. Heiser, A Critical Review of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1996); Carl Tobias, Contemplating the End ofFederal Civil Justice
Reform in Montana, 58 MONT. L. REV. 281 (1997).
67

Federal Courts Improvement Act of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 206, 114 Stat. 2410, 2414 (2000) (providing for sunset).
See D. MT. R. 105-2 (requiring somewhat different procedures for consenting to magistrate judge jurisdiction than 28 U.S.C.A. §
636 requires); D. Nv. R. IB 2-2 (same); D. OR. R. 72.1 (same); see also Hajek v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.
1999) (invalidating a local rule inconsistent with a federal rule); Patrick Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the Long Range
Plan, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 665 (1997) (arguing that the Civil Justice Reform Act should require rather than permit courts to
stop experimenting with changes in local rules when the sunset provision of the act is triggered); Carl Tobias, Did the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 Actually Expire?, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 887 (1998) (arguing that since the date in the sunset
clause of the Civil Justice Reform Act has been reached, Congress or the Judicial Conference should stop allowing district courts
to use procedural rules that are inconsistent with federal rules).
68

Court Rules: Amendments to Federal Rules, 192 F.R.D. 340, 384-85 (2000) (indicating purpose of amendments to Federal
Rules of Procedure was to restore national uniformity to discovery practice). See generally Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000
Federal Civil Rules Amendments, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 75, 79-81 (2000) (same and discussing the effects of the opt-out clause in
the 1993 revision to Federal Rule 26 requiring automatic disclosures).
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You might ensure that the court discharges similar duties regarding its local appellate rules. 69 The
tribunal should ascertain whether the rules depart from or repeat the federal analogues and, if so, abolish
or change them. For instance, the court in 1999 abrogated a local rule that imposed limits on briefs'
length that were different from the federal rule. 70 However, the circuit permits judges to seek rehearing en
bane, although the federal mandate says only parties may do so.71 The tribunal has also levied sanctions
for noncompliance with local commands even though the federal rules discourage this practice.72 Should
the court not monitor its own rules, the Judicial Conference could eliminate or alter violative provisions.73
This power is "little known and seldom invoked," but the one time that it was used involved a request that
the Conference invalidate a Ninth Circuit rule. 74 The court may prefer its own review to one imposed by
an external entity.
D. · A MISCELLANY OF DUTIES

The Chief Judge and the Circuit Judicial Council must undertake myriad other responsibilities.
ranging across a broad spectrum. Certain of these obligations are somewhat pedestrian and a number of
the duties are fundamentally ceremonial, but assignments that may appear mundane in fact involve
important matters of substance and procedure.
Council responsibilities for choosing magistrate and bankruptcy judges who serve in the fifteen federal
districts epitomize its significant obligations.75 The rather arcane appointment processes seemingly limit

69

28 U.S.C.A. § 2071 (a) (West 1993) (requiring consistent local appellate rules); FED. R. APP. P. 47 (same). See generally
Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization ofAppellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing the effects of district courts having inconsistent procedural rules and recommending the adoption of·
uniform national rules).

°

7

Compare 9rn CIR. R. 32 (declaring that briefs must match the requirements in Fed. R. App. P. 32) with FED. R. APP. P. 32
(detailing the requirements for brieflength and format); see also former 9rn CIR. R. 32. See generally Sisk, supra note 69, at 16
(discussing different circuit court rules on brief length and format).
71

Compare 9rn CIR. R. 35-2 (preventing court from ordering rehearing en bane without first giving parties opportunity to
comment) with FED. R. APP. P. 35(b) (indicating that parties may apply for a rehearing en bane). See generally United States v.
Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1299 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, C.J., concurring) (arguing that there is no authority for a judge to request a
rehearing en bane); Michael Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29 (1988) (examining the history of the
en bane process and suggesting the use of objective criteria to determine when an en bane hearing should be granted).
72

See, e.g., Great S. Co. v. Davis, 57 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1995) (sanctioning counsel for failing to conform to procedural rules);
Suarez v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 996 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1993) (sanctioning counsel for
failing to conform to circuit rules); Kalombo v. Hughes Mkt., 886 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1989). But cf FED. R. APP. P. 47(b)
(discouraging sanctions for violation oflocal rules, absent actual notice).

73

See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 331 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001), 2071 (c) (2) (West 1993) (establishing the Judicial Conference of the
United States, which will review local procedural rules to ensure consistency with federal law); FED. R. APP. P. 47 (authorizing
each court of appeals to make and amend its procedural rules that must be consistent with federal law); see also LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 5, at 59 (suggesting that the Conference invoke its oversight powers and reduce the number oflocal rules).
74

Sisk, supra note 69, at 51-52. Five states' attorneys general asked that the Conference invalidate the local Ninth Circuit Rule
22 that covers death penalty appeals, but the Conference essentially remanded the question to the Ninth Circuit by inviting its
reconsideration. See id.; see also 9rn CIR. R. 22; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 1HE U.S., COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, MINurns OF 1HE MEETING OF JANUARY 11-13 (1995), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/95-0l .htm; Peter G.
McCabe, Renewal ofthe Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1690 n.182 (1995) (discussing the modification
request).
75

See28 U.S.C.A. §§ 152(West1993), 631(West1993 & Supp. 2001).
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Council discretion. For example, district judges recommend lawyers to be magistrate judges,76 while a merit
selection panel evaluates applicants for bankruptcy judgeships, interviews a few finalists and provides the
Council suggestions.77 The procedures for appointing magistrate judges include incentives, namely alleviating
trial judges' caseload burdens, which encourage meritocratic proposals, although potential remains to forward
less qualified prospects and merit is a relative term. Reform, thus, could be indicated; however, district judges
should receive some deference. The district judges can best appreciate the needs of the local bench, litigants
and bar; will have personally observed candidates' abilities; and will work with appointees on a daily basis.78
In short, change might be warranted, but the Council may prefer to retain the status quo or to examine the
names tendered more closely.
Troubleshooting is one of your principal responsibilities. For instance, if judges fail to resolve cases
efficiently or to fulfill other obligations you should offer advice or resources and even cajole them. The
chief judge also promptly reviews complaints alleging that a circuit, district, bankruptcy, or magistrate
judge has prejudiced effective and expeditious administration of the court's business or is unable to
perform official duties because of a mental or physical disability. 79 If you do not issue a written order
with reasons for dismissal of the complaint or conclusion of the proceeding, 80 a committee must
investigate the complaint and promptly prepare a report and recommendation for the Council, which
concomitantly investigates further or institutes measures for insuring the proper discharge of judicial
business. 81 The need to foster public confidence in the courts, Article III judges' life tenure and

76

28 U.S.C.A. § 631 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001). See generally CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS (1983) (describing survey results regarding the duties of magistrate judges); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, UNITED
STATES MAGISTRATES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: SUBORDINATE JUDGES (1990) (analyzing the roles and effects of magistrate
judges in the federal court system); R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the Federal Magistrate Judge in Civil Justice Reform, 67
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 799 (1993) (reviewing federal court reliance on magistrate judges as a tool for civil justice reform).
77

28 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West 1993); see also NBRC, supra note 17, at ch.3. See generally William W Schwarzer & Neil
McGaraghan, The Administrative Relationship Between the District and Bankruptcy Courts, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 9 (2000)
(discussing the changes in the role of bankruptcy courts after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
78

See Tobias, supra note 64, at 1623-27; see also Carl Tobias, Magistrate Judges in the Montana Federal District, 174 F.R.D.
514 (1997). Similar ideas apply to the selection of bankruptcy judges. The council does retain ultimate authority, but members
may be reluctant to disturb proposals of an expert panel that screens candidates.
79

28 U.S.C.A. § 372(c)(l)-(2) (West 1993) (establishing procedures for responding to allegations of prejudicial activity by
judges); see, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d 320 (9th Cir. 1995) (resolving a complaint filed against a
bankruptcy judge); see RULES OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL
MISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY [hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT RULES]. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of
Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 278-86 (1993) (discussing informal disciplinary actions against chiefcircuitjudges).
80

28 U.S.C.A. § 372(c)(3) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001) (requiring chief judges to issue written orders when resolving complaints
against other judges); NINTH CIRCUIT RULES, supra note 79. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Dept. of Navy, 974 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir.
1992); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 691F.2d923 (9th Cir. 1982). See generally Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging,
Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability and Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of I980, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 25, 51-92 (1993) (reviewing empirical data on the actions taken by chief judges concerning
complaints against other judges).
81

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 372(c)(4)-(6) (West 1993) (establishing procedures for committee investigation of complaints against
judges); see also NINTH CIRCUIT RULES, supra note 79. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal
Judges, and How? 149 F.R.D. 375 (1993) (evaluating the application of the informal methods of judicial discipline established
by the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act).
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independence, and your relationships with these colleagues mean the tasks will be critical, complex, and
delicate. 82

IV. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
An important responsibility that Congress assigns the chief judges in all twelve regional circuits and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is service on the United States Judicial
Conference (the Conference), which is the federal courts' policymaking arm. 83 That task could facilitate
your promotion of certain initiatives because of the Conference's authority to announce and implement
substantive and procedural positions on behalf of the federal judiciary.
One major Conference obligation is to develop suggestions for creating new judgeships. 84 Its reliance
on the AO's :finely-calibrated, conservative estimates of judicial workloads and filings seeins to limit
Conference discretion. 85 The calculations, however, are only future projections. The body consults the
tribunals and judges, demographic trends, political feasibility, and related factors in making final
recommendations. For example, the entity honored your court'-s request to add five members. 86 The
Conference similarly respected other tribunals' preferences for the status quo, 87 even though they furnish
the lowest percentages of arguments and published opinions and the situation could have been rectified by
adding new judgeships.88 In short, the body exercises considerable discretion when :finalizing proposals.
Because new judicial positions would enhance Ninth Circuit operations, you should support Conference
efforts that urge Congress to pass a judgeships bill. 89
The Conference also assumes some responsibility for law clerk hiring. The entity lacks technical
control over this process, but can offer helpful guidance and influence judges' practices. 9 For example,

°
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See Emily Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History ofFederal Judicial Service-and Disservice-1789-1992, 142
U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1993) (reviewing the motivations prompting judicial resignations and considering the relationship between
judicial misbehavior, accountability, and independence). For a wide-ranging discussion of judicial discipline, see Symposium,
Disciplining the Federal Judiciary, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1-430 (1993). For a miscellany of additional council duties, see SUJ!ra
note 49.
83

28 U.S.C.A. § 331 (West Supp. 2001) (describing the Judicial Conference of the United States); Schwarzer, supra note 49,
at 1137-40 (discussing the policymaking role of the Conference). Because the Conference conducts much business at biannual
private sessions, affording advice is difficult, but I can offer some guidance with examples.
84

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 331 (West Supp. 2001). See generally sources cited supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.

85

See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.

86

See supra note 58.

87

Id.

88
See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 11, at 93, tbls.2-3; see also id. at 26-27 (affording judges' responses to questions regarding
the need for more judgeships); Tobias, supra note 56, at 563-66 (assessing the federal courts).
89

This will be controversial, especially for the Ninth Circuit. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.

90

See, e.g., Edward R. Becker et. al., The Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104
L.J. 207, 208-12 (1994) (considering the history of law clerk hiring and suggesting solutions for a smoother and more
effective hiring process); Carl Tobias, Stuck Inside the Heartland With Those Coastline Clerking Blues Again, 1995 WIS. L. REV.
919, 923-25 (analyzing the potential effects of some recommendations for coordinated law clerk hiring and suggesting
alternatives).
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its 1993 resolution prescribed a benchmark for interviews beginning March 1 of applicants' second year
of law school. 91 The regime had proved a reasonable, albeit imperfect, system in the subsequent half
decade. 92 Despite that success, the Conference rescinded the guideline in 1998.93 Continued inaction has
made recent employment seasons notoriously chaotic with many students applying, and certain judges
hiring, ahead of the third semester. You are well positioned to help address this conundrum. A few Ninth
Circuit members may have exacerbated matters since 1998 by screening prior to students' second year,
although numerous judges of your court and other tribunals' members find this practice intolerable. The best
resolution might be delaying offers until applicants' fifth semester. 94 Even reinstitution of the March 1
proviso, which a number of judges as well as most law students and schools respected, appears better than
the status quo.
Finally, the Conference provides an environment conducive to crafting measures that effectively
treat caseload increases with scarce resources. The judiciary could experience difficulty persuading
senators and representatives to implement salutary relief until it reaches consensus on the optimum
approach. 95 At this juncture, additional judicial positions or court staff seem preferable for many circuits,
especially the Ninth. 96 However, either option could impose disadvantages, such as reduced collegiality
or greater bureaucratization. 97

91

See JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 49 (1993). See generally Becker et al., supra note 90, at 207208 (discussing the history of law clerk hiring and endorsing the establishment of a March 1 benchmark for beginning law clerk
interviews); Trenton H. Norris, The Judicial Clerkship Selection Process: An Applicant's Perspective on Bad Apples, Sour
Grapes, and Fruitful Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 765, 786-88 (1993) (criticizing the unstructured process for hiring law clerks and
reviewing reform efforts).

92

Many judges and most law students and schools followed the guidance, thus ameliorating the prior confusion that had
permitted law clerk hiring to begin earlier. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, A Market-Based Solution to the Judicial Clerkship
Selection Process, 59 MD. L. REv. 129, 135, 160-62 (2000) (discussing disadvantages to interviewing in first year or first half of
second year and benefits of March 1 system); Annette E. Clark, On Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Judicial Clerk
Selection Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 GEO. L.J. 1749, 1751-53 (1995) (discussing how open market of judicial
clerkships pressures judges and students alike to start the interviewing process sooner than later-at the time in question from
late in "third year to midway in his second year."). But see Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707
(1991) (writing in support ofunregulated open market for law clerks).
93

"It has become apparent that the Judicial Conference recommendation on law clerk interviews has not been universally
followed [and] is not an accurate reflection of the practice in the courts [and] there appears to be no consensus within the
judiciary as to whether any alternate standardized policy could be more successful." JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF
THE PROCEEDINGS 38 (1998); see also Norris, supra note 91, at 786-88 (reviewing the history ofreform efforts).
94

This would give judges two years of law school and summer job performance on which to base decisions and students
greater time to secure experience, sharpen and display skills, and make more informed career choices. For two new proposals,
see Christopher Avery et al., The Market/or Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793 (2001); Jonathan Groner,
Disarming the Clerks Race Judge Offers Proposal to Slow Recruitment Process, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 10, 2001, at 1.
95

Orchestrating this initiative and the clerkships employment endeavor could help to dispel possible views of numerous judges
and additional federal courts observers that the Ninth Circuit considers itself the best, as well as the biggest, appellate court. See
supra notes 33-36, 42, 46-47 and accompanying text.
96

See supra notes 57-60, 89 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.

97

See supra notes 50, 59-60 and accompanying text. You could also suggest that the Conference adopt positions on a Ninth
Circuit split or reconfiguration generally. However, broaching these issues would enable its members who favor division an
opportunity to endorse officially both possibilities, although both lack efficacy.
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DEAR CHIEF JUDGE SCHROEDER
V.

CONCLUSION

Congratulations on recently assuming the chief judgeship of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. Your two-decade experience on the tribunal will facilitate administration of the largest
appellate court. If the Ninth Circuit considers the ideas above, the tribunal may avoid certain pitfalls,
might resolve numerous complicated problems that it will confront, and could function even more
effectively.
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